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Abstract
The present study focused on interference in a group of patients with amnesia due to Korsakoff’s syndrome (KS) within the 
domain of spatial memory. An object–location memory task was used in which participants first learned an array of objects 
on a computer screen, followed by a reconstruction of the object positions. Next a trial was given in which the same objects 
were presented only now in different locations. Participants had to place the objects a second time but at the new locations. 
This was repeated for seven pairs of baseline/interference trials. Both Korsakoff patients and matched controls did worse 
on the interference trials than on the baseline trials, indicating that it is difficult to relearn new spatial locations for objects 
that previously were remembered in other locations. When computing relative interference effects (that is the percentage 
change from baseline in the interference trials), Korsakoff patients were less affected than controls. It is discussed in how far 
interference depends on the strength of the original memories, which are markedly lower in KS patients.
Keywords Object–location memory · Interference · Amnesia · Korsakoff’s syndrome
Introduction
Interference has long been identified as one the prime rea‑
sons for memory failure (McGeoch 1932; see Oberauer and 
Lin 2017, for its role in visual working memory). Compe‑
tition between items in memory may cause sincere prob‑
lems in learning, storage and/ or retrieval. The possibility 
that amnestic patients suffer in particular from interference 
effects has received considerable attention (Cowan et al. 
2004; Dewar et al. 2010, 2012; Humphreys 2001; Kopelman 
2002; Shimamura et al. 1995; Mayes et al. 1994), although 
the results are mixed (see also Craig et al. 2016).
In the present study, we further investigated interference 
in a group of patients with amnesia due to Korsakoff’s syn‑
drome (KS) within the domain of spatial memory. KS is 
a chronic disorder, characterized by severe cognitive dys‑
function, caused by lesions in the diencephalon, notably the 
thalamus and mammillary bodies, due to chronic alcohol 
abuse and thiamine deficiency (Arts et al. 2017; Fama et al. 
2012). Most pronounced are the memory deficits, including 
both anterograde and retrograde amnesia (Kopelman 1995). 
The amnesia involves specifically explicit memory whereas 
implicit memory appears relatively spared (Oudman et al. 
2011, 2015; Postma et al. 2008b).
Although the amnesia in KS is severe, it is particularly 
relevant for rehabilitation purposes to know to what extent 
KS patients are still able to acquire new information, either 
explicitly or implicitly. For this reason we investigated in 
which manner interference affects learning of new spatial 
information in KS patients in the present study. Two types of 
interference are important here (cf. Radvansky 2011). One 
is labeled negative transfer. That is, prior knowledge can 
have a negative effect on the learning of new information, 
in particular when there is an overlap (e.g., items coming 
from the same categories or sharing physical resemblances). 
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Notice that negative transfer in particular plays a role in skill 
learning where it may yield its effects mostly in an implicit 
manner (Woltz et al. 2000). Second, there is proactive inter‑
ference: the forgetting of new information because of pre‑
existing older memories. Whereas negative transfer causes 
interference by hampering the acquisition phase, proactive 
interference influences the later processing stages of storage 
or retrieval.
Several studies have examined the factors that hamper 
memory for new information in KS patients. Cermak et al. 
(1977) observed that filling a delay with interfering activi‑
ties impaired memory of KS patients for both verbal and 
nonverbal material. Strauss and Butler (1978) showed that 
KS patients performed worse than an alcoholic control group 
in a haptic (i.e., active touch) memory task when various 
types of interference were presented. However, these two 
studies are examples of distraction or dual tasks effects, 
rather than of proactive interference proper or of negative 
transfer. Kinsbourne and Winocur (1980) found evidence for 
stronger negative transfer in KS patients on a list‑learning 
task containing word pairs. If the first half of the word pairs 
were coupled with new words when learning a second list, 
the patients’ performance significantly dropped. The authors 
explained their findings in terms of encoding difficulties in 
the new learning situation. Winocur et al. (1981) reported 
a similar buildup of proactive interference effects in KS 
patients when testing recall of successive lists of nouns from 
the same category. Release of proactive interference was 
achieved by introducing a category shift, but KS patients still 
needed additional cues in order for release of interference to 
occur compared to controls.
An important question is whether interference works dif‑
ferently for spatial memory. In his elegant paper on interfer‑
ence in spatial memory, Elmes (1988) discusses first the 
theoretical notion following from the work by O’Keefe and 
Nadel (1978) that the allocentric cognitive mapping system 
is insusceptible to interference by similar items. That is, we 
actually may profit from exploring the same locations, land‑
marks and roads from different directions when building an 
allocentric environmental map. In contrast, the taxon sys‑
tem (important for egocentric route representations) might 
strongly suffer from interference. In four experiments, Elmes 
(1988) observed considerable inference effects for learning 
and relearning of spatial mazes and for the locations of pairs 
of cards in a ‘concentration’ game.
Object–location memory differs from navigation in that 
there is no specific route or sequential aspect involved. 
Moreover, the spatial range typically is smaller (Postma and 
van der Ham 2016). Interference effects may be specifically 
large in object–location memory. This concerns the question 
how easily we can remember the new location of an object 
that first occupied a different location. Either proactive inter‑
ference or negative transfer could hamper performance in 
these situations that are highly common in our daily life. 
That is, our personal belongings are typically small, move‑
able objects that can easily shift from one location to another 
in our house or living space. The inability to effectively store 
these new object locations may result in long, tiresome 
searches. In a classical neuropsychological study, Smith 
et al. (1995) showed series of pictures of objects in spatial 
arrays to patients with lesions in the medial‑temporal lobe, 
including the hippocampus, patients with lesions in the pre‑
frontal cortex and control participants. After the study phase, 
the participants had to place the pictures at the correct loca‑
tions in an empty array. Next, the same objects were shown 
again, but in a new spatial arrangement. Larger proactive 
interference effects were found in both the prefrontal and 
medial‑temporal lobe patients compared to controls.
In KS patients, who have diencephalic dysfunction, defi‑
cits in object–location memory have been well‑documented 
(Kessels and Kopelman 2012; Kessels et al. 2000; Mayes 
et al. 1991; Postma et al. 2006, 2008b; Shoqeirat and Mayes 
1991), but proactive interference or negative transfer has 
been examined to a lesser degree in this domain and in 
these patients. In this light, the goal of the present study 
was to further investigate the patterns of interference in an 
object–location memory paradigm in amnesic patients with 
KS. We analyzed both positional memory and object–loca‑
tion binding scores (cf. Postma et  al. 2008a). We also 
computed relative difference scores between baseline and 
interference trials in order to assess the extent of interfer‑
ence (cf. Smith et al. 1995). Finally, we assessed whether 
interference‑based errors were biased towards the spatial 
coordinates of the inducing (baseline) stimulus.
Methods
Participants
Twenty patients diagnosed with KS participated in this 
study (12 men). They were all inpatients of the Centre of 
Excellence for Korsakoff and Alcohol‑Related Cognitive 
Disorders of Vincent van Gogh Institute for Psychiatry in 
Venray, the Netherlands. For all patients, the current intelli‑
gence level of each participant had to be in concordance with 
the estimation of premorbid functioning based on occupa‑
tional and educational history to exclude cases of dementia 
(Oslin et al. 1998). Two patients (1 male) with estimated IQ 
scores below 80 were excluded because of low intellectual 
functioning interfering with the testing procedure, possi‑
bly caused by alcohol‑related dementia. The remaining 18 
patients (11 men) and 19 (6 men) age‑, IQ‑ and education‑
matched controls were included in the analysis. All patients 
fulfilled the DSM‑5 criteria for alcohol‑induced major neu‑
rocognitive disorder (American Psychiatric Association 
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2013), supported by neurological, psychiatric, neuropsycho‑
logical examinations, as well as neuroimaging findings. All 
patients also fulfilled the clinical criteria for KS described by 
Kopelman (2002). All patients were in the chronic, amnestic 
stage of the syndrome, whereas none of the patients was in 
the confusional Wernicke psychosis at the moment of test‑
ing. Moreover, every patient had been abstinent from alcohol 
for at least 6 weeks. Patients had an extensive history of 
alcoholism and nutritional depletion, notably thiamine defi‑
ciency, as verified through medical charts or family reports.
All patients completed the Dutch version of the California 
Verbal Learning Test (a task measuring verbal immediate 
and long‑term memory; Mulder et al. 1996) and the Riv‑
ermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT; Wilson et al. 
1985) as measures of episodic memory and the Corsi Block‑
Tapping Task (Kessels et al. 2000) as a measure of working 
memory.
Nineteen healthy control participants were included as 
well (6 men). None had a history of psychiatric disorders, 
neurologic disease or subjective cognitive complaints (self‑
report). For all participants education level was assessed 
using seven categories, one being the lowest (less than 
primary school) and seven being the highest (academic 
degree) (Duits and Kessels 2014). Premorbid IQ was esti‑
mated with the Dutch version of the National Adult Reading 
Test (Schmand et al. 1991). The study was approved by the 
Institutional Review Board of Vincent van Gogh Institute for 
Psychiatry and written informed consents were obtained at 
recruitment in all participants in accordance with the Dec‑
laration of Helsinki.
Table 1 summarizes the demographic variables of all par‑
ticipants and the neuropsychological test results and radio‑
logical findings for the patients. Controls and patients did 
not differ in age (t(35) = 0.04, p = 0.968), sex distribution 
(χ2(1) = 0.217, p = 0.642), education level (t(35) = 0.493, 
p = 0.625), or NART IQ (t(35) = 1.857, p = 0.072).
Materials and procedure
Object–location memory was assessed by means of the 
computer program Object Relocation (Kessels et al. 1999). 
In each trial, ten colored images of easy‑to‑name everyday 
objects—measuring approximately 1 × 1 cm—were pre‑
sented for 30 s on a computer screen within a square frame 
measuring 19 × 19 cm. Next, an empty square frame was 
shown with the 10 objects displayed on a row above the 
frame. Participants were instructed to reposition the objects 
at their initial locations. Once an object was placed in the 
frame it could be moved to other locations as often as a par‑
ticipant desired. The object–location memory stimuli were 
shown on a 15‑in. Elo Entuitive monitor with touch‑sensitive 
screen. Figure 1 gives a schematic overview of two consecu‑
tive trials (baseline and interference trial).
The object–location memory test started with a practice 
trial in which only four objects were shown. Next, 7 blocks 
of 2 object–location memory trials with 10 objects each 
followed. The first trial of a block always was a baseline 
trial, containing a completely new set of objects placed at 
new positions. The second trial of a block was the inter‑
ference trial. Here, the same objects were shown as in the 
preceding baseline trial, but at new positions. Spatial con‑
figurations of baseline and interference trials were made by 
an automatic generation procedure of the object–location 
Table 1  Demographic variables, neuropsychological test results, and 
radiological finding of the Korsakoff’s patients
a Education level was scored using seven categories: 1 = lowest (less 
than primary school), 7 = highest (university degree) (Duits and Kes‑
sels 2014)
b NART = Dutch version of the National Adult Reading Test 
(Schmand et al. 1991)
c Based on the total score of the five learning trials, normative data 
from Mulder et al. (1996)
d Based on normative data from Van Balen et al. (1996). Note that the 
RBMT was not administered in one patient due to logistic reasons
e All patients performed within the normal range based on normative 
data from Kessels et al. (2000)
Korsakoff 
patients 
(N = 18)
Healthy 
controls 
(N = 19)
Sex distribution (m:f) 11:7 6:13
Age (mean + SD) 50.7 (7.4) 50.8 (7.4)
Education level (mean + SD)a 4.5 (0.9) 4.6 (0.8)
NART IQ (mean + SD)b 96.5 (9.3) 101.8 (1.8)
California Verbal Learning  Testc
 Severely impaired 12 (67%)
 Moderately impaired 2 (11%)
 Mildly impaired 4 (22%)
Rivermead Behavioural Memory  Testd
 Severely impaired 14 (78%)
 Moderately impaired 2 (11%)
 Mildly impaired 1 (5%)
Corsi Block‑Tapping Task (mean + SD)e 5.3 (0.93)
Neuroimaging
 MRI 13
 CT 3
 Not available 2
Neuroradiological findings
 Abnormalities in mammillary bodies 8
 Diffuse cortical atrophy 7
 Diffuse white matter lesions 4
 Cerebellar atrophy 3
 No abnormalities 3
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memory program (open to minor manual adjustments such 
as placing objects not too closely together). All partici‑
pants received the same trials in a fixed order.1
Analyses
To determine the accuracy of the locations of the reposi‑
tioned objects, the absolute displacement error was com‑
puted. This is the absolute distance between the original 
object location and the reconstructed object location in 
mm, summed over the 10 objects in the stimulus display. 
A second spatial error measure was computed as well: the 
positional best‑fit score, reflecting how accurately the posi‑
tional configurations were reconstructed, irrespective of the 
object identities (Kessels et al. 1999). The absolute errors 
scores and best‑fit scores were analyzed separately in 2 × 2 
repeated‑measures analyses of variance (ANOVA), with 
Group as a between‑subjects factor (two levels: KS patients 
vs. healthy controls) and Task condition (two levels: baseline 
vs. interference) as within‑subject factor. Effect sizes were 
computed for all analyses (ηp2).
We also computed a percentage difference score, both for 
the absolute error and the best‑fit scores, loosely based on 
the procedure reported by Smith et al. (1995, p. 281) as a 
measure of relative interference. This percentage difference 
score is the difference between the raw score (i.e., either 
the absolute displacement error or the best‑fit score) on an 
interference trial and the performance on the correspond‑
ing baseline trial, expressed as the percentage change with 
respect to the baseline performance. For each participant 
relative interference scores were thus computed, averaged 
across all trial blocks. Independent t tests were conducted 
on the relative interference scores for the absolute error per‑
formance and for the best‑fit performance, including group 
(KS patients, controls) as between‑subject factor. Pearson 
product moment correlation coefficients (r) were computed 
between baseline errors and the relative interference scores.
Finally, we computed a third type of performance meas‑
ure. We calculated a new absolute displacement error by 
using the original object location coordinates from the 
baseline trial and the coordinates of the corresponding 
objects in the interference trial, as reconstructed by the 
participant. Moreover, we also calculated a similar new 
absolute displacement error by taking the original object 
locations from the interference trial and the reconstructed 
positions of the corresponding objects in the baseline 
trial. Since the spatial configurations for the baseline and 
interference trials were made in (quasi)random fashion 
the combination of interference trial original locations 
and baseline reconstructed locations can be considered to 
reflect chance performance in the object–location mem‑
ory task. In contrast, the combination baseline original 
Fig. 1  Schematic overview of two consecutive trials in the object–
location memory task; participants are shown a display with common 
objects placed at pseudorandom locations, followed by a recall test in 
which objects have to be repositioned at their correct locations. Next, 
an interference trial is presented, showing the same objects, but at dif‑
ferent locations. In the recall test, these objects have to be placed at 
the locations they occupied in the last presentation
1 By giving a fixed stimulus order, we ensured that the difficulty 
of the task was exactly the same for the two groups. As pointed out 
by an anonymous reviewer, there may have been some a priori dif‑
ferences between the spatial layouts used in the baseline stimuli and 
those used in the interference stimuli. However, the stimulus dis‑
plays were created in (quasi)random fashion. We examined whether 
the study‑phase spatial layouts of the baseline stimuli differed from 
those in the interference trials, taking the object locations as inde‑
pendent units (70 in the baseline stimuli and 70 in the interference 
stimuli). There were no differences between the two stimulus types 
with respect to the spatial coordinates used in the study phase, mak‑
ing systematic a priori differences between the baseline and interfer‑
ence trials unlikely.
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locations and interference trial reconstructed locations 
might possibly show some lingering influence of the base‑
line spatial configuration on the subsequently repositioned 
objects in the interference trial. This may be a measure of 
an implicit memory influence across baseline and interfer‑
ence within trials. An implicit spatial‑memory effect is 
reflected by lower new absolute displacement errors in the 
combination baseline original locations–interference trial 
reconstructed locations than in the chance performance 
combination (i.e., combination interference trial original 
locations–baseline reconstructed locations).
Results
A 2 × 2 ANOVA, including condition (baseline, interfer‑
ence) as a within subjects factor and group (KS patients, 
controls) as a between‑subjects factor, was conducted on 
the absolute error scores. It revealed a main condition effect 
(F[1, 35] = 37.7, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.52), indicating that errors 
on the interference trials were higher than on the baseline 
trials. Moreover, the main effect of group (F[1, 35] = 36.2, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.51) confirmed that KS patients overall per‑
formed worse compared to healthy controls. Notably, the 
condition × group interaction was not statistically significant.
Running a similar ANOVA on the best‑fit scores showed 
also a main effect of condition (F[1, 35] = 9.99, p < 0.01, 
ηp2 = 0.22) and a main effect of group (F[1, 35] = 32.92, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.49). Best‑fit scores were worse in the 
interference than in the baseline trials and worse in the KS 
patients than in the controls. Again, the condition × group 
interaction was not statistically significant (Fig. 2).
Figure 3 shows the scatterplots of the relative inter‑
ference scores for the absolute and best‑fit error scores, 
respectively. For both the absolute errors and the best‑fit 
score, a negative correlation was found between baseline 
performance and relative interference effect, suggesting 
that stronger memory at baseline results in relatively more 
interference (r[37] = − 0.69, p < 0.01 for the absolute errors; 
Fig. 2  Spatial‑memory scores in mm (summed over 10 objects in a 
stimulus display, averaged across stimuli) across condition (baseline 
and interference) and per group (controls vs. Korsakoff patients). 
Error bars indicate standard errors
Fig. 3  Scatter plots showing the relative interference effect as a function of baseline performance (i.e., distance errors in mm; sum of 10 objects 
in a stimulus display, averaged across stimuli) for the absolute error scores (a) and the best‑fit error scores (b)
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r[37] = − 0.61, p < 0.01, for the best‑fit scores). When com‑
puting these correlations for the separate groups, similar cor‑
relations were observed in the control group (r[19] = − 0.61, 
p < 0.01 for the absolute errors; r[19] = − 0.79, p < 0.01, for 
the best‑fit scores). In the patient group baseline perfor‑
mance and relative interference effect correlated signifi‑
cantly (r[18] = − 0.78, p < 0.01) for the absolute errors, but 
not for the best‑fit scores (r[18] = − 0.35, ns).
In order to compare the groups on relative interference 
levels, we conducted two separate independent t tests. There 
was a group effect for the relative interference effects on the 
absolute errors t[35] = 2.51, p < 0.05 (14.3% in KS patients; 
37.6% in controls). Relative interference was more than 
twice as high in controls than in KS patients. No such dif‑
ference was observed for the best‑fit scores t[35] = 1.52, ns 
(5.1% in KS patients vs. 12.7% in controls, respectively). 
One could argue that the maximum relative increase from 
baseline that can be reached is limited by how close the 
baseline performance is to chance performance. In other 
words, if a participant already has a poor baseline score from 
the start, there may not be enough room to become much 
worse in the interference condition. As we argue below, 
chance level is 916 mm. A number of the KS patients indeed 
has average baseline absolute errors of around 800 mm (see 
Fig. 3a). Importantly, several of them do not show any inter‑
ference‑based error increase at all or only a very limited one. 
Even though the maximum relative interference increase is 
technically limited in KS patients, there still is room for a 
larger increase than the 14% increase we observed now (if 
patients would have had an increase of 37%, similar to that 
of the controls, their average interference scores would have 
been 889 mm).2
Finally, we compared the two groups on the reordered 
spatial distance scores, that is reconstructed locations in the 
baseline trials linked to the original place coordinates in the 
interference trials (KS patients mean 914.8 mm, SEM 8.9; 
control mean 918.3 mm, SEM 8.7), and vice versa recon‑
structed locations in the interference trials coupled to the 
original baseline coordinates (KS patients mean 843.6 mm, 
SEM 17.7; control mean 833.4 mm, SEM 17.3). We found 
that the former combination yielded higher scores than the 
latter (F[1, 35] = 43.18, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.55). However, nei‑
ther the group effect nor the group by recombined scores 
interaction was statistically significant. As we argued above, 
the combination of original interference trial coordinates 
with baseline reposition coordinates might give an estimate 
of chance performance on this type of task. The average 
chance level over all participants was: 916 mm, SE 6.1, min‑
imum 861 mm, maximum 993 mm. Both the small standard 
error and the limited range of values suggest that the aver‑
age value of 916 might be an appropriate approximation 
of chance. We next contrasted KS patients’ absolute errors 
performance on the baseline trials and the interference tri‑
als with chance. Both performances differed significantly 
from chance (t[17] = 8.1, p < 0.001 for the baseline trials and 
t[17] = 7.8, p < 0.001 for the interference trials, respectively).
Discussion
Memory for spatial context information is compromised in 
KS patients (Kessels et al. 2000; Postma et al. 2006, 2008b; 
Shoqeirat and Mayes 1991). The current study examined 
whether heightened susceptibility to interference (i.e., how 
well patients can associate new locations with ‘old’ objects) 
underlies these spatial‑memory deficits. More specifically, 
we investigated mechanisms of proactive interference or 
negative transfer in object–location memory in KS patients.
A first prerequisite in this investigation was that we 
observed interference effects within the present experimen‑
tal design. Indeed we found that the overall performance 
dropped substantially when having to learn new locations for 
objects that were previously studied and tested in combina‑
tion with other locations. In the introduction we argued that 
this reflects either proactive or negative transfer. We cannot 
really differentiate between the two options here. In light of 
the fact that the different trials directly followed each other 
with only limited time in between, we are inclined to think 
that mostly the encoding of new location information is at 
stake here. Hence the interference most likely reflects nega‑
tive transfer.
Central in the current study was the comparison between 
KS patients and matched controls with respect to inter‑
ference effects in object–location memory. Two patterns 
of results bear on this comparison. First, the raw spatial‑
memory scores showed that both controls and KS patients 
suffered from interference effects, but did not significantly 
differ in the size of these effects. Second, in contrast to the 
findings for the raw spatial‑memory scores we did observe 
a clear group difference when looking at the relative size of 
the interference effect (the percentage change compared to 
baseline), with controls being relatively more affected by the 
interference manipulation. It also appeared that the relative 
interference effect is directly driven by the strength of the 
first established memory trace, as indicated by the (negative) 
correlation between the two. We should mention here that 
these correlations are somewhat flawed, since the baseline 
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing up this point. Of 
course other technical error limitations are related to the size of the 
square frame, since participants cannot place objects outside the 
square. Hence the maximum distance error occurs when an object is 
placed in the opposite furthest corner of the square frame. For all the 
locations chosen in the baseline stimuli this distance was 1970  mm 
(i.e., summed over the 10 locations in a stimulus) and 1980 mm for 
the locations in the interference stimuli.
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performance level is also used to compute the relative inter‑
ference score (hence it features twice in the correlation). 
Notwithstanding this reason for caution, the pattern seems 
to suggest that KS patients, having weaker memories from 
the start, may have a relative benefit when having to learn 
new object–location associations.
In light of this last suggestion, it is interesting to consider 
how control participants deal with forming new associations. 
Possibly, they need to actively suppress the old associations 
during the interference trials. This mechanism might be 
similar to the active inhibitory process revealed in the moti‑
vated forgetting paradigm (Anderson and Hanslmayr 2014), 
recruiting the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. In other 
words, to counter interference by strong existing memories 
dorsolateral prefrontal control processes are required. KS 
patients are known to have impaired control processing or 
executive function deficits. Consequently, we expect that 
under circumstances requiring executive inhibitory control 
(that is, situations with strong baseline memories) they will 
show enlarged interference effects.
Interestingly, the group difference with respect to the 
relative interference effect exclusively applied to the abso‑
lute error scores, but not to the best‑fit scores. KS patients 
demonstrated a smaller relative interference effect than the 
controls. The absolute errors reflect a process of binding 
objects to locations (e.g., remembering ‘what was where’), 
whereas best‑fit scores reflect positional memory per se 
(e.g., remembering which positions in a display were occu‑
pied) (Postma et al. 2008a). Apparently it is the formation of 
new object–location associations that drives the interference 
effects and the group differences observed in the present 
study. Future studies may investigate whether interference 
also occurs in the reverse situation: old locations occupied 
by new objects across trials. If not, it would signal that 
object–location associations and location–object associa‑
tions are asymmetric, distinct processes.
Are KS patients affected on all dimensions of object–loca‑
tion memory? In the present study, we also computed the 
errors scores when coupling repositioned coordinates on the 
interference trials to the corresponding object coordinates on 
the baseline trials and compared this to the reverse coupling 
(i.e., baseline repositions with interference trials’ original 
object coordinates). We observed smaller error scores in 
the former recombination. This marks a subtle influence of 
the first object–location pattern learned on the next trial. 
We speculate that this influence is most likely implicit, as 
participants are typically deliberately and consciously focus‑
ing on the new locations in the current (interference) trial. 
Importantly KS patients did not differ from controls on these 
implicit spatial‑memory scores. This is in agreement with 
previous evidence for spared implicit spatial memory in KS 
patients (Oudman et al. 2011, 2015; Postma et al. 2008a, 
b). Together with the lower relative interference scores in 
patients, the interference effects in the present paradigm 
thus may be driven by the competition between old and new 
memory traces at the explicit level.
In sum, the present study confirmed a large deficit in KS 
patients in associating objects with locations. This deficit 
is not due to increased sensitivity to proactive and/or nega‑
tive transfer interference effects. The negative transfer to 
some extent depends on the strength of the old memories, 
which are markedly lower in KS patients. As a result, learn‑
ing of new information is relatively less affected. A critical 
future test will be to see whether strengthening the original 
memory traces (e.g., by repeated or longer learning; see also 
Shoqeirat and Mayes 1991) may increase relative interfer‑
ence effects in KS patients at or past the level encountered 
in healthy controls.3
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